This paper investigates why financial market experts misperceive the interest rate policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Assuming a Taylor-rule-type reaction function of the ECB, we use qualitative survey data on expectations about the future interest rate, inflation, and output to discover the sources of individual interest rate forecast errors. Based on a panel random coefficient model, we show that financial experts have systematically misperceived the ECB's interest rate rule. However, although experts tend to overestimate the impact of inflation on future interest rates, perceptions of monetary policy have become more accurate since clarification of the ECB's monetary policy strategy in May 2003. We find that this improved communication has reduced disagreement over the ECB's response to expected inflation during the financial crisis.
deemphasized the role of monetary aggregates for short-term policy decisions. Since then, the ECB's monetary analysis puts more emphasis on the long-term relationship between money supply and inflation. We also investigate whether the market's understanding of monetary policy has been affected by the recent economic crisis.
A great deal of research confirms the predictive content of survey data for macroeconomic variables, see e.g. Mitchell and Pearce (2007) and Dreger and Stadtmann (2008) , who study the forecasting performance of the Wall Street Journal's panel of economists. Nolte and Pohlmeier (2007) find that economic indicators derived from the ZEW survey give good quality forecasts. Thus, survey data on expectations are increasingly used in the literature to evaluate central bank communication. For example, Capistrán and Ramos-Francia (2010) and Ehrmann, Eijffinger, and Fratzscher (2010) explore how the introduction of inflation targeting affects the dispersion of inflation expectations in surveys. Lange, Sack, and Whitesell (2003) , Swanson (2006) , Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) , and Sturm and de Haan (2009) show that more transparent communication generally improves market participants' predictions of the central bank's interest rate decisions.
All these contributions focus on the size and other statistical properties of individual forecast errors; no attempt is made to explain why interest rate forecast errors are made. Work by Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) is closest in spirit to the approach we undertake here. These authors investigate the role of geography, i.e., the forecaster's location, in interest rate forecast error. By estimating Taylor-rule-type relationships for each forecaster separately, they decompose forecast errors as being either systematic or unsystematic. We extend Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) in that our analysis of financial market experts' interest rate forecast errors includes information from the individual forecasts about inflation and output. Moreover, because we estimate a panel random coefficient model that allows for a dispersion of the estimated coefficients, our empirical approach can estimate the disagreement be-tween financial experts over monetary policy strategy, see Swamy (1970) and Rangvid, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2009) 
Our empirical results confirm that both the ECB and financial market experts use inflation as a Taylor rule argument. However, financial experts tend to overestimate the ECB's interest rate reaction to inflation. The ECB's attempt to clarify its mon- The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the ZEW financial market survey data and briefly discusses how recent work has used the aggregate survey balance statistics versus the individual survey expectations. Section 3 derives and decomposes interest rate forecast errors from a standard Taylor rule. Section 4 presents the econometric model, Section 5 sets out the empirical results on misperception of the ECB interest rate policy; Section 6 concludes.
Survey Data on Expectations

The ZEW Financial Market Survey
The Data Set
Since December 1991, the ZEW has been asking approximately 350 financial sector professionals about their expectations regarding a large set of macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, output, and interest rates. These professionals, or "financial market experts," usually have an academic background in economics and are also engaged in observing economic developments so they should be highly qualified for forecasting economic developments. Most of them work at banks (60%); the rest are employed by the insurance industry (10%), financial departments of industrial companies (11%), or by other financial service providers. A majority (88%) of these financial market experts are employed in Germany, 10% are located within the European region, and 2% are from non-European countries.
Usually during the first two weeks of a month, the financial market experts are asked whether they expect short-term interest rates to decrease (-1), stay constant (0), or to increase (1) within the next six months. The experts are asked for their predictions of the three-month interbank rate, i.e., the three-month Euribor in the Euro zone.
Other questions asked that are relevant to this study have to do with changes in the annual inflation rate and the economic situation in the Euro zone. We approximate them by the six-month change in HICP inflation and by the six-month growth rate of industrial production, respectively. We prefer industrial production to GDP data because the former are available monthly, whereas the latter are available only quarterly. Table 4 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics, Table 5 
The Forecasting Performance of Aggregate Balance Statistics
The forecasting performance of the ZEW survey expectations is detailed in the literature. Breitung and Jagodzinski (2001) and Hüfner and Schröder (2002) find that the ZEW Economic Sentiment Indicator, the survey's aggregate balance statistic of output growth expectations for Germany, has good forecasting quality. The forecasting power of inflation and short-term interest rate balances is tested by Nolte and Pohlmeier (2007) . The authors discuss a VAR-based forecasting approach and quantification methods that transform the shares of positive and negative assessments from the survey into a quantitative variable, see Carlson and Parkin (1975) , and on the regression approach Pesaran (1984) . Nolte and Pohlmeier (2007) find that the survey forecasts are unbiased and that their predictive power is comparable to a random walk. Furthermore, they find no support for the hypothesis that experts' forecasting quality depends on subgroups. Ullrich (2008) quantifies the aggregate shares of inflation expectations by means of the Carlson-Parkin method and shows that they are significantly influenced by ECB rhetoric. Her findings suggest that financial market experts keep a sharp eye on ECB communication. These papers have in common that they work with the aggregate balance statistics and do not consider individual heterogeneity.
Heterogeneous Forecasters
When exploring the expectation formation process, one should account for the heterogeneity of forecasters, which can be done in several ways. For the Wall Street Journal's panel of economists, Mitchell and Pearce (2007) classify the participants according to subgroups depending on industry or experience. For the same survey panel, Dreger and Stadtmann (2008) show that the heterogeneity in exchange rate forecasts cannot be explained by individual forecasts of macroeconomic variables in the survey context. A more sophisticated way to model forecasters' heterogeneity is proposed by Rangvid, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2009) . They estimate a panel random coefficient model for the stock market expectations of participants in the ZEW financial market survey. In the following, we adopt the random coefficient approach where forecasters' heterogeneity is reflected in the distribution of estimated coefficients.
Individual Interest Rate Forecasts and Taylor Rules
Most of the relevant literature evaluating the accuracy of forecasts makes no attempt to explain the sources of interest rate forecast errors. In an exception to this trend, Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) 
The Taylor rule is defined in terms of sixth differences (∆ 6 ) because the qualitative survey data refer to interest rate changes over six months. From a theoretical point of view, the output gap should be part of the Taylor rule. However, by taking differences, potential output drops out of the equation.
Decomposing Individual Forecast Errors
If the central bank follows a Taylor rule, financial market experts may also use a Taylor rule in formulating their expectations of the central bank decision. Given the survey horizon of six months, an expert j is expected to form his interest rate expectations in t − 6 for period t according to the following Taylor-rule-type forecast equation
According to Equation (2), the interest rate change expected by expert j depends on his expected change in inflation ∆ 6 π e jt and output ∆ 6 y e jt . Note that the expert's expectations for inflation and output should be interpreted as a proxy for the forecasts the expert assumes the central bank to have. Unfortunately, these expectations
are not asked about in the survey. However, it is likely that experts' inflation and output expectations are influenced by the central bank forecasts, which are regularly published.
The interest rate forecast errors e i * jt are obtained by subtracting the financial market expert's forecast (Equation (2)) from the actually observed interest rate set by the central bank (Equation (1))
where the asterisk in e i * jt is used to be consistent with the latent variable formulation of the econometric model in Section 4. Equation (3) will be estimated in Section 5. To derive the financial market experts' misperception regarding central bank parameters, Equation (3) is rewritten as:
with e π jt = ∆ 6 π t − ∆ 6 π e jt and e y jt = ∆ 6 y t − ∆ 6 y e jt . Equation (4) shows that the overall individual interest rate forecast error can be decomposed into two parts. The first part (α j e π jt + β j e y jt ) follows from the error a financial market expert makes in forecasting inflation and output. The second component ((α − α j )∆ 6 π t + (β − β j )∆ 6 y t ) is due to the analyst's misperception of how the central bank will react to changes in inflation and output. The central bank can influence both causes of error. First, it can provide the public with macroeconomic projections and, second, it can explain how it reacts to changes in these variables.
Qualitative Interest Rate Forecast Errors
The answers of the surveyed experts are qualitative, whereas the actual, observed data series is continuous. One way of making the two comparable is to transform the aggregate shares of responses into a quantitative series. 2 In our application, where the focus is on the individual level, it is more appropriate to transform the realized, quantitative interest rate data into a qualitative variable. To that aim, we transform the sixth differences of the actual interest rate series (∆ 6 i t ) into the corresponding qualitative variable ∆ 6 i q jt as follows:
where ∆ 6 i j and ∆ 6 i j denote individual lower and upper thresholds, which have been surveyed by a special question in the ZEW survey. Within these-partly asymmetricalthresholds, a financial market analyst would continue to say that the underlying macroeconomic variable will not change. Note that individual thresholds imply that the qualitative interest rate variable ∆ 6 i q jt also depends on the expert. 3 The qualitative interest rate forecast errors e i jt of expert j are defined as the difference between the qualitative change of the interest rate ∆ 6 i q jt and the expert's forecast made in period t − 6 for the change of i six months ahead ∆ 6 i e jt :
The descriptive statistics on the resulting qualitative interest rate forecast errors, provided in Table 1 , show that the mean value of the forecast error e i is close to zero. Moreover, the forecast errors are always between -1 and +1, implying that the directional forecast has always been correct. 
The logit model assumes that ε jt are i.i.d. and follow a logistic distribution Φ. The outcome probabilities P for the observed values e i of the latent variable conditional on the vector of explanatory variables z jt = (1, ∆ 6 π t , ∆ 6 y t , ∆ 6 π e jt , ∆ 6 y e jt ) are defined as follows, see Wooldridge (2001) :
where ς 1 is a threshold parameter for the probability categories.
To measure dispersion of the forecasting models across the financial market experts, we estimate a random coefficient model according to Swamy (1970) . Under this approach, we incorporate cross-sectional heterogeneity of the assessments for inflation and output. Cross-sectional heterogeneity in Equation (7) is introduced via the random coefficients α j and β j . Specifically, the random coefficients are specified as follows:
with ξ α j , ξ 
The ECB's Clarification of the Monetary Policy Strategy
Given the economic interpretation of the mean and dispersion parameters of the random coefficient model for the experts' interest rate forecast errors, we now test whether these parameters responded to ECB communication or to the financial market crisis.
The ECB made two announcements with respect to monetary policy strategy. In the first, in October 1998, 4 the ECB declared that its strategy would consist of three elements. Price stability, the primary objective, would be achieved with inflation rates of below 2%. Money would play a prominent role in assessing the risks to price stability and the outlook for price stability would be based on a broad assessment. In clearly that inflation rates of less than, but close to, 2% are desirable. At the same time, by classifying money as a means for cross-checking the risks to price stability, the role of money in its short-term interest rate policy was de-emphasized.
4 See ECB press release "A stability-oriented monetary policy strategy for the ESCB" on October 13, 1998.
5 See ECB press release "The ECB's monetary policy" on May 8, 2003.
The ECB has repeatedly emphasized that the May 2003 announcement should be viewed as a clarification and should not be misinterpreted as a change in its monetary policy strategy, see, e.g., Berger, de Haan, and Sturm (2006) . Accordingly, the experts' understanding of monetary policy should have become clearer due to improved central bank communication. In terms of the econometric model, the mean coefficients should be closer to the central bank coefficients after the May announcement and the dispersion parameters should have decreased. Because the ECB explicitly "confirmed" its strategy and has since emphasized that the announcement was not a change in policy, in our estimation we assume that the central bank parameters are constant over time. Similarly, we assume that ECB's monetary policy strategy did not change during the financial market crisis. In fact, the ECB has not published any statements to the contrary. Also, during the financial market crisis, the ECB motivated interest rate decreases with diminished inflation risks. Table 2 sets forth the random coefficients of the financial market experts, which are shown in terms of the parameter means across experts (ᾱ,β) and the dispersion measures (σ α , σ β ).
Why Financial Experts Misperceive the ECB's Interest Rate Decisions: Empirical Results
The positive central bank parameter α for inflation indicates that the probability of tighter monetary policy increases with inflation. This result is in line with the ECB's monetary policy strategy, which clearly emphasizes price stability as its primary objective. In contrast, the sign of the estimated output parameter β of the central bank Notes: According to Table 2 , the experts have a significantly positive inflation parameter in all three subperiods. Table 3 shows the average analyst misperception of central bank reaction with respect to inflation (ᾱ − α) and output growth (β − β). According to the Table 2 shows that disagreement with respect to the inflation parameter is relatively moderate and hardly changes during the entire sample period. In particular, the experts' disagreement over the ECB's reaction to inflation does not become stronger during the financial crisis.
With respect to output growth, the estimated parameters of the financial market experts are negatively signed until July 2007 and positively signed since August 2007 (see Table 2 ). The latter finding suggests that financial analysts expected the ECB to be more supportive of output growth. Indeed, the ECB decreased interest rates from 4% in August 2007 to 1.5% in March 2009. The ECB motivated monetary policy easing primarily with declining inflationary risks. Table 3 shows that the experts' assessment of the weight of output growth deviated significantly from the central bank's weight in all subperiods. The strongest misperception regarding the ECB's reaction to output growth appears during the period of the financial crisis. Until
July 2007, disagreement about the output parameter (σ β ) was similar in size to the dispersion parameter for inflation, but it has increased considerably since the financial crisis, suggesting a stronger disagreement over the ECB's reaction to output.
The mean squared error (M SE) in the third panel of Table 2 represents a summary impreciseness measure for the experts' misperception of the ECB's interest rate policy.
For example, M SE α = (ᾱ − α) 2 + σ 2 α accounts in each subperiod for the deviation of the experts' average inflation parameterᾱ from the central bank parameter α and the dispersion σ α . Table 2 shows that for inflation, this measure decreases over time, whereas for the output parameter, the mean squared error is highest since the outbreak of the financial crisis.
Conclusions
There is a growing consensus among economists and central bankers that expectations A.1 More Details about the Data Change in 3-month Euribor from t − 6 to t ∆ 6 π t Change in annual HICP inflation from t − 6 to t, SA ∆ 6 y t Growth of industrial production from t − 6 to t, SA Survey expectations Survey question ∆ 6 i e jt "In the medium-term (6 months) the short-term interest rates (3-month-Interbank rate) will ... increase / no change / decrease" ∆ 6 π e jt "In the medium-term (6 months) the macroeconomic annual inflation rate will ... increase / no change / decrease" ∆ 6 y e jt "In the medium-term (6 months) the overall macroeconomic situation will ... improve / no change / worsen" Definition of subperiods D 
